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Abstract 
 
Same-sex marriage has become a divisive issue in established western democracies. 
As in earlier research on abortion, there is now a growing body of studies which 
suggests that religious factors, such as identity, belief and practice, are the most 
frequent predictors of opposition towards gay marriage. Yet, what we know about the 
combined influence of these religious factors remains unexamined. Mindful of this 
omission, this study examines the relationship between regular church attendance and 
a belief in God on attitudes towards same-sex marriage and abortion rights. Using 
recent survey data from Northern Ireland, the results suggest that not only are those 
who belong but do not believe distinctive in terms of their demographic makeup, but 
they are also significantly more likely to adopt a liberal stance in relation to both these 
issues – gay marriage and abortion rights – than the most religiously devout, or those 
who both belong and believe. 
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Introduction 
Public opinion provides an important barometer of likely future voting patterns and 
legislative recognition of gay marriage and abortion rights. As a number of scholars 
have noted, landmark legislative decisions, particularly at the national level, have 
often been precipitated by shifting opinions among the general public. This seems to 
be particularly the case when the question of gay rights is considered. In fact, some 
scholars go so far as to suggest that the political endorsement and legislative activity 
in relation to gay marriage in the United States and Europe reflects a ‘sea change’ in 
public opinion in support for gay marriage, particularly over the last two decades 
Brewer (2014). This is not to deny, however, that there are ongoing and heated 
debates, and some important differences, both within and between nations, in relation 
to this issue. There is also a notable East/West divide in Europe, with significantly 
lower levels of support for same-sex marriage as well as gay rights, generally among 
former communist countries, such as Poland (Fitzgerald et al., 2014).   
Accompanying these changes in public opinion and legislative rights for gay 
couples, there is also a growing body of research examining the social correlates of 
attitudes towards same-sex marriage, albeit more so in the United States than in 
Europe and elsewhere.  As in studies on attitudes towards abortion (Jelen and Wilcox, 
2003, 2005; Froese and Bader, 2010; Barkan, 2014; Clements, 2015; Lizotte, 2015), 
such research finds that religious factors such as affiliation, regular church attendance 
and beliefs in and about God are among the most frequent predictors of opposition to 
gay marriage (Olson et al., 2006; Whitehead, 2010; Clements and Field, 2014; Hayes 
and Dowds, 2015). Religious communities have also been divided internally in their 
response to changing public views. In fact, some analysts go so far as to suggest that 
public disputes and differences in opinion over homosexual rights have now replaced 
abortion as the most significant and divisive moral issue facing many religious 
communities today (Wilcox, 2007; Badgett, 2009; McKinnon et al., 2011; Hayes and 
Dowds, 2015; Brittain and McKinnon, 2018). 
Although an increasing number of studies have included religious measures in 
their analysis of support for either gay marriage or abortion rights, to date, little effort 
has been made to understand exactly how the effect of these religious factors, such as 
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religious traditions, practices and beliefs, shape public opinion. Moreover, there has 
been almost no attempt to investigate how the two key dimensions of religious life – 
practices and beliefs – intertwine in determining attitudes towards both these issues, 
even though sociologists have found interactions between belief and practice in their 
effects on a range of other outcome variables (McKinnon 2003; Paxton, Reith and 
Glanville 2014; Schieman et al., 2017). To date, studies that have been conducted 
have tended to adopt a singular approach, namely seeking to evaluate and compare the 
independent, or net, effect of each of these religious measures on attitudes towards 
abortion or gay rights.  It is with this omission in mind that this study focuses directly 
on the link between religious beliefs and practices in assessing the impact of religion 
on attitudes towards gay marriage and abortion, currently two of most salient public 
moral issues in Northern Ireland (Thomson, 2016). More specifically, using data from 
the 2015 Northern Ireland General Election Study and applying the typology – 
believing and belonging – it seeks to assess the degree to which the differing 
intersections of belief and practice are a key distinguishing factor in predicting 
attitudes towards both gay marriage and reproductive rights within this society. 
The use of Northern Ireland as a case study may be considered particularly 
appropriate for the following three reasons. First, unlike many other western post-
industrial nations, Northern Ireland remains a deeply religious society. Despite the 
subjective and voluntary nature of religious identification within this society, 
Northern Ireland continues to maintain a very high rate of religious belonging.  
Current survey data suggest that just over 90 per cent of the adult population self-
identify with a religious affiliation, the vast majority of which belong to either the 
Protestant (46 per cent) or Catholic (35 per cent) tradition. At eight per cent, there is 
also a small minority of religious independents – those who currently claim to have no 
religious affiliation – whose religious origins are primarily drawn from the Protestant 
tradition (Hayes and McAllister, 2013). It is important to note, moreover, that this 
religious affiliation is more than merely nominal: Northern Ireland has traditionally 
manifested one of the highest levels of religious observance found in Europe (Fahey 
et al., 2006). Second, unlike Great Britain, where abortion (albeit with some 
restrictions) and gay marriage are legally available, both gay marriage and abortion 
remain legally prohibited in Northern Ireland.1 Third, and contrary to many other 
 4  
  
  
western industrialised societies, the question of gay marriage and abortion remains a 
highly contentious and ongoing issue within this society.  For example, since its 
establishment in 1998, the Northern Ireland Assembly has voted on a number of 
separate occasions to prohibit either same-sex marriage or the extension of the 1967 
Abortion Act in Britain to Northern Ireland (Hayes and Nagle 2016; Thomson, 2016).  
Believing and belonging: towards a conceptual framework 
Sociologists have long recognised that religion is a multidimensional phenomenon, 
encompassing aspects of belief, practice and identity. Only more recently have 
sociologists of religion begun to also recognise the multiple dimensions and 
complexity of non-religion (Lee, 2012), or try to make conceptual and empirical sense 
of the ‘fuzziness’ that lies between religion and non-religion (Storm, 2009; Voas, 
2009; Voas and Day, 2010; Stolz et al., 2016). One of the attempts to capture some of 
the complexity in a parsimonious way has arisen following Grace Davie’s (1994) 
description of religiosity in Britain as ‘believing without belonging.’ Davie raised the 
question about the extent to which individuals in Britain, and indeed many western 
European nations, continue to hold on to ‘deep-seated religious aspirations’, despite a 
notable decline in church attendance and other measures of religious practice. 
According to Davie, many Britons, continue to believe – albeit, in a fuzzier, less 
creedal sense – without attending church regularly, or even infrequently. As Davie 
(1994, 463) put it: ‘More and more people within British society are, it appears, 
wanting to believe but without putting their belief in practice.’  Davie thus argued that 
religious practices and beliefs could be distinguished analytically, and were at least 
partially independent of each other. 
This contention marked the beginning of some controversy with Davie’s thesis 
attracting criticism from sociologists who adhere to a more traditional theory of 
secularisation, in which it is generally presumed that belief and practice cannot be 
separated, at least not in the long-run. They argued that what Davie was pointing to 
was, at most, a transitional phase in the trajectory of secularisation (Voas and Crockett 
2005; Voas 2009). If regular church attendance declines ahead of belief, so the 
argument goes, we can assume that belief’s demise cannot be far behind. This now 
famous phrase has nevertheless resonated with a number of scholars, both as a theme 
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and in its variations. It has also prompted a consideration of the other quadrants of the 
typology that can be logically extrapolated from this phrase: sociologists have long 
recognised that some people are neither believing nor belonging, and others are both 
believing and belonging. However, besides the two above derivatives, there is also an 
additional category – those who belong without believing. Such non-believing 
attenders have often been either ignored, or at least considered to be socially and 
politically insignificant.  
Nevertheless, Nordic scholars and those studying religion in the region have 
found this quadrant of the typology – belonging without believing – the most useful as 
a means of characterising their societies. Those who are ‘belonging without believing’ 
or ‘the culturally religious’, are those who remain strongly attached to their churches 
and occasionally participate in its rituals without believing in God or other key tenets 
of the Christian faith (Zuckerman 2008; Kasselstrand 2015). This phrase has not only 
been applied as an apt description for scholars writing about established Protestant 
churches in Scandinavia, but it has also been adopted by some sociologists writing 
about predominantly Catholic countries, presenting it as a characteristic of a 
proportion of the population both of Italy (Garelli 2013) and the Republic of Ireland. 
As Inglis (2007, 216), in pointing to the emergence of what he termed ‘individualist 
Catholics’ in the Republic of Ireland, put it: ‘The proportion (88%) who go to Mass 
about once a month or more often is striking. As in Italy and Spain, it is higher than 
the proportion who believe in life after death. Is this evidence of a new type of 
Catholic who likes to go to Mass for the experience and sense of community – a case 
of belonging without believing?’  
In summary, the link between religious practice and belief remains a highly 
contested and complex issue.  This is particularly the case in Europe where the study 
of religious change has revolved around a debate about the nature and extent of 
secularisation. For example, some scholars point to a direct downward link between 
religious belief and belonging – or a movement from the most religiously committed 
(those who believe and belong) to the wholly secular (those who neither believe nor 
belong) – in terms of the changing religious landscape within these societies (Crockett 
and Voas 2005). Others, however, suggest an inverse effect between religious belief 
and belonging; namely the growth in a more ‘fuzzy’ or ‘distanced’ type of religious 
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fidelity, or the rise in those who believe but do not belong as well as those who 
continue to belong but do not believe (Davie 2002; Storm 2009; Stolz et al. 2016). It 
is with this complexity in mind that this article focuses on the relationship between 
religion and moral attitudes in Northern Ireland. More specifically, applying the 
fourfold typology – the intersection between believing and belonging – it seeks to 
assess the degree to which individuals who belong but who do not believe, the most 
understudied group, hold distinct views in terms of their attitudes towards gay 
marriage and reproductive rights within this society. 
Data and methods  
The data used in the analysis come from the 2015 Northern Ireland Election Survey.2 
Conducted immediately after the Northern Ireland Westminster Election in May 2015, 
the Northern Ireland Election Survey was a nationally representative survey of all 
adults aged 18 or older. Using a questionnaire design, it is based on face-to face 
interviews involving 1,810 adults, with a response rate of 68.3 per cent. Given our 
main focus of interest, the impact of religion on attitudes towards the legalisation of 
gay marriage and abortion rights, only the two main religious groupings – Catholics 
and Protestants – in Northern Ireland are included in the investigation. This accounts 
for 1,464 individuals or 80.9 per cent of the total sample.3 Attitudes towards same-sex 
marriage and abortion rights, our two dependent variables of interest, are 
operationalised in terms of two single-item measures, namely levels of support or 
opposition to the legalisation of gay marriage or abortion in Northern Ireland. More 
specifically, respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statements ‘Gay 
marriage should be made legal in Northern Ireland’ and ‘Abortion should be made 
legal in Northern Ireland’ using a five-point Likert scale, from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree. The abortion question offers no qualifications, either in the 
statement, nor as options in the response, as to under what conditions the respondent 
feels an abortion should be a legal option (for example, when the mother’s life is at 
risk – currently permitted – or in cases of rape and incest, or other defined special 
conditions). 
 Religion, our primary explanatory variable of interest, is operationalised in 
terms of the typology of believing and belonging. As in previous research, whereas 
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belief is defined as a belief in God, belonging is operationalised as a regular church 
attender. And, while we acknowledge that there is some disagreement about how 
‘belonging’ should be operationalised – either as a matter of identity or participation – 
we adhere to the latter view that ‘belonging’ is best captured by an indicator of active 
participation, in practice, regular church attendance (Francis and Robbins 2004).  
Sociologists from a variety of theoretical perspectives have assumed that belief and 
practice must correspond, at least in the medium term.  However, the Davie typology 
calls into question this assumption. Following Voas and Day’s (2010, 5) suggestion as 
to the need for some further investigation of this issue, we also seek to examine the 
connection between belief and practice empirically.  
Religious belief and religious practice are both complex, multidimensional 
phenomena, as scholars of lived religion and lived non-religion would observe 
(McGuire 2008; Ammerman 2014). Most measures of religion are blunt instruments 
and better suited to understanding Christian groups with clear commitment and 
narrowly conventional (especially Protestant) beliefs (Wuthnow 2014). Further, there 
are limitations inherent in reducing ‘belief’ to a single variable with degrees of belief 
in God, or practice to frequency of church attendance. Although there are limits to 
what one can say on the basis of these restricted measures, we are fortunate to have 
such data available for analysis, given the relative infrequency with which 
representative surveys, especially outside of the United States, ask questions about 
substantive religious beliefs.  
In addition, we include a number of socio-demographic control variables, such 
as religious affiliation, gender, marital status, age, education, occupation, and 
employment status. Previous studies in the United States, Britain, Northern Ireland, 
and elsewhere in Europe, show that women, the unmarried, the young and the socio-
economically privileged, are notably more tolerant in their views towards gay 
marriage and reproductive rights compared with men, married people, older 
individuals and the lesser-privileged. The influence of religious identity is dependent 
on the particular moral attribute that is to be investigated (Jelen and Wilcox 2003, 
2005; Olsen et al., 2006; Froese and Bader 2010; Barkan 2014; Clements 2014; Hayes 
and Dowds 2015; Lizotte 2015). For example, previous research in Northern Ireland 
and elsewhere suggests that while Catholics are more supportive of gay marriage than 
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Protestants, they tend to be less supportive of abortion rights, particularly when 
comparisons to non-evangelical or mainline Protestants are considered (Hayes and 
McAllister,1995; Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Hoffman and Johnson 2005; Fahey et al. 
2006; Clements 2014; Hayes and Nagle 2016). With the exception of age (coded in 
years), all control variables were included as a series of dummy variables (coded 0 
and 1) in the analysis. The investigation proceeds in two stages. First, applying the 
typology developed by Davie, we examine the analytical link between religious belief 
and practice by outlining the numerical composition on all four groups among the 
adult population in Northern Ireland as well as by highlighting any differences in 
socio-economic background between them. Building on this investigation and using 
multivariate regression analysis, we then focus on the degree to which these differing 
intersections of belief and practice – particularly among those who belong but do not 
believe – are a key distinguishing factor in predicting attitudes towards gay marriage 
and reproductive rights within this society. 
Believing and belonging: operationalising the typology 
Table 1 begins the investigation by examining the nature and extent of religious belief 
and practice in Northern Ireland. A key focus of this investigation is to illustrate the 
degree to which religious belief and practice are intertwined within this society. As in 
previous research, the results suggest that Northern Ireland remains a deeply religious 
society and this is particularly the case when religious belief is considered. While 
nearly seven in every ten respondents, or 68 per cent of the adult population, claim to 
believe in God – either with or without doubts – less than one-third say that they do 
not. Moreover, among those who expressed a belief in God, the vast majority reported 
that they believed without any doubt. This pattern is repeated when non-believers are 
considered; among the latter it is intermittent belief rather than non-belief, which is 
the most reported category. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
A similar, albeit somewhat converse, result emerges when religious 
observance, or church attendance rates, are considered. While just over two-fifths of 
individuals, or 44 per cent, claimed to attend church on a regular or at least monthly 
basis, a majority – or 56 per cent – did not.  It is important to note, however, among 
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the latter, that it is less frequent church attendance rather than complete non-
attendance which is the most dominant pattern. For example, whereas 46 per cent of 
all respondents stated that they attended church on a less than monthly basis, the 
equivalent proportion among those who never attended was just 10 per cent. Thus, at 
least as far as religious belief and observance in Northern Ireland is concerned, there 
is some indirect evidence to suggest that in addition to those who believe and belong – 
the most religiously committed group – there is also a sizeable proportion of the adult 
population that believe but do not belong.   
To investigate this issue directly, Figure 1 presents the relationship between 
religious belief and practice. For the purposes of this investigation and in line with 
Davie’s typology, four groups are distinguished in the analysis: individuals who 
believe and belong; individuals who belong but do not believe; individuals who 
believe but do not belong; and individuals who neither believe nor belong. As the data 
in Figure 1 indicates, while the most religiously committed – those who believe and 
belong – are the largest group at 36 per cent, there is also a notable and almost 
equivalent number of individuals who believe but do not belong, or exactly a third in 
this instance. This is not to discount, however, the relatively large number of 
respondents who may be considered wholly secular – who neither believe nor belong 
– at just over a fifth, or 23 per cent in this instance, as well as the small minority of 
individuals who belong but do not believe (8 per cent), otherwise known as the 
culturally religious, or as Davie (2000, 3) put it: ‘[those] who believe in belonging’ 
(see also Day 2011). 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Who are the culturally religious – those who belong but do not believe? 
While much research attention has been paid to the socio-demographic or background 
characteristics of those who believe and do not belong or to those who neither believe 
nor belong, this is not the case when the culturally religious, or those who belong but 
do not believe, are considered (Storm 2009). The few studies, albeit predominantly 
European, that do exist suggest that in comparison to both the most secular and 
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religiously committed, those who do not believe but belong, are more likely to be 
male, younger, lesser educated and, when confronted by a Protestant majority, such as 
in Northern Ireland, they are predominantly drawn from the Catholic tradition (Storm 
2009; Kasselstrand 2015; Bullivant 2016; Stolz et al., 2016). A somewhat more mixed 
pattern is echoed when those who believe but do not belong are considered, who are 
again disproportionally male and young but, in this instance, are drawn from among 
the more educated members of society (Demerath, 2000; Voas 2009; Storm 2009; 
Wilkins-Laflamme 2014).  
To what extent do similar differences occur when the culturally religious – 
those who belong but do not believe – in Northern Ireland are considered? Table 2 
addresses this question. As in our earlier investigation in Figure 1, four religious 
groupings are again distinguished in the analysis with those who belong but do not 
believe – the culturally religious – as the baseline category of comparison.  The results 
in Table 2, however, lend only partial support to earlier findings from previous 
research in the area.  Although there were some notable differences in socio-
demographic background between the culturally religious and the other religious 
groupings, only in relation to those who were wholly secular – those who neither 
believe nor belong – are these differences almost uniform and also markedly 
distinctive.  
Focusing initially on respondents who attend church on a regular basis, only in 
relation to religious affiliation, age and employment status, are there any notable 
differences between the two groups in relation to this issue. In comparison to the most 
religiously committed, not only are the culturally religious significantly more likely to 
be Catholic but they are also notably more likely to be drawn from the younger and 
employed sections of the adult population. For example, whereas two-thirds of the 
culturally religious are members of the Catholic faith, the equivalent proportion 
among the most religious – those who both believe and belong – is markedly lower at 
just 48 per cent. A similar finding is echoed when age is considered; younger adults 
are notably more likely to belong but not believe as compared to their more 
religiously committed counterparts.    
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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A much more pronounced pattern of difference emerges when comparisons to 
the non-attenders at religious services are considered and this is particularly the case 
when those who neither believe nor belong are examined.  Here, on all but one 
attribute – non-manual occupation – there are marked differences between the two 
groups in terms of their demographic makeup. In comparison to those who neither 
believe nor belong, whereas those who belong but do not believe were again 
significantly more likely to be Catholic and, in this instance, drawn from both the 
well-educated and employed section of the adult population, they were also more 
likely to be female, married and aged between 18-45 years. For example, while 66 per 
cent of the culturally religious were members of the Catholic faith and 61 per cent 
were female, the equivalent proportions among the wholly secular were just 33 per 
cent and 47 per cent, respectively. This is not the case, however, when the younger 
members of society, or those aged 18-45 years, were considered; just half of those 
who did not believe but attended church on a regular basis fell into this category as 
compared to 66 per cent among the wholly secular.  With two notable exceptions – 
marital and employment status – these findings are repeated when the socio-
demographic profile of those who belong but do not believe versus those who believe 
but do not belong is compared. 
In summary, the results are clear: those who belong but do not believe, or the 
culturally religious, are more likely to be female, married, among the better educated, 
and drawn from the Catholic tradition. Moreover, this relationship holds irrespective 
of whether a comparison with the most religiously committed or those who do not 
believe or attend are considered. There is also evidence to suggest that while the 
culturally religious are somewhat similar in their socio-demographic profile to the 
most religiously committed as well as to those who believe but do not belong, this is 
not the case when the wholly secular is considered where marked differences occurred 
in relation to this issue.  
Belief, belonging, and attitudes towards gay marriage and abortion 
As noted earlier, previous research on gay marriage and abortion rights finds that 
religious factors, such as affiliation, regular church attendance and beliefs in and 
about God, are among the most frequent net predictors of opposition to gay marriage 
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and abortion rights. To what extent is this also the case when the intersection between 
religious beliefs and practices, or the Davie typology, is considered? In other words, 
are there notable differences between those who belong and do not believe, and the 
other religiously-defined groups?  Table 3 addressed this question. As in our earlier 
analysis four groups are distinguished in the investigation with individuals who 
belong but do not believe – the culturally religious – as our baseline category of 
comparison. The results are clear. Irrespective of whether support for gay marriage or 
abortion are considered, there are notable differences among attenders. Individuals 
who belong but do not believe are much more supportive in their views than the most 
religiously committed. This is not the case in comparison with non-attenders, where 
respondents express quite similar views, regardless of whether or not they are 
believers. 
Focusing initially on the attitudes towards gay marriage among the attenders, 
here it is non-believers, or the culturally religious, that stand out as the most liberal in 
their views. For example, whereas two-thirds of those who belong but do not believe 
agree with gay marriage, the equivalent proportion among the most religiously 
committed – those who both belong and believe – was notably lower at just 38 per 
cent. A similar, albeit converse, pattern emerges when lack of support is considered 
and this is particularly the case among those who strongly disagree. For example, 
whereas just nine per cent of non-believers who attend church on a monthly basis 
were strongly opposed to the legalisation of gay marriage and a further six per cent 
were opposed, the equivalent cumulative proportion among those who both believe 
and attend was nearly treble this amount at 44 per cent, or 30 per cent and 14 per cent, 
respectively. Thus at least as far as attenders are concerned, it is those who belong but 
do not believe who are the most liberal in their views.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
This is not the case, however, when attitudes among the culturally religious 
and those who do not attend religious services are compared, where no major 
differences emerged in terms of their views. For example, whereas 60 per cent of 
those who believe but do not belong agree with gay marriage or just six percentage 
points less than our reference group (those who belong but do not believe), the 
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equivalent proportion among the wholly secular was just two percentage points lower 
at 58 per cent. A similar pattern emerges when those who oppose gay marriage are 
considered. While an almost identical proportion of the wholly secular and the 
culturally religious – 17 per cent as compared to 15 per cent – disagreed with gay 
marriage, the equivalent percentage among those who believe but do not belong is 
somewhat higher at 27 per cent. This is not to discount, however, the much higher 
proportion of individuals overall, or 52 per cent in this instance, who agree with the 
legalisation of gay marriage as compared to just 30 per cent who are opposed to such 
an initiative.   
These patterns are replicated when attitudes towards abortion are considered, 
although it should be noted that levels of support are somewhat lower in this instance.  
Focusing initially on the attenders, again it is non-believers, or the culturally religious, 
that stand out as the most liberal in their views. For example, whereas just over half of 
those who belong but do not believe agree with the legalisation of abortion, the 
equivalent proportion among the most religiously committed – those who both belong 
and believe – was nearly half this amount at just 29 per cent. By contrast, while just 
19 per cent of non-believers who attend church on a monthly basis were opposed to 
abortion rights, the equivalent proportion among the most religiously committed, or 
believers who attend, is twenty-eight percentage points higher at 47 per cent. Thus, at 
least as far as attitudes towards abortion among the attenders are concerned, it is again 
those who belong but do not believe who stand out as the most supportive in their 
views.   
Again, this is not the case, however, when attitudes among the culturally 
religious are compared with those who do not attend church services, where no major 
differences emerged in terms of their views. For example, whereas 51 per cent of 
those who believe but do not belong support abortion, or just two percentage points 
less than our reference group (those who belong but do not believe), the equivalent 
proportion among the wholly secular is just five percentage points higher at 56 per 
cent. A similar pattern emerges when those who oppose abortion are considered. 
While an almost identical proportion of the wholly secular and culturally religious – 
20 per cent as compared to 19 per cent – disagreed with abortion, the equivalent 
percentage among those who believe but do not belong is just six percentage points 
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higher at 26 per cent. This is not to discount, however, the higher proportion of 
individuals overall, or 44 per cent in this instance, who agree with the legalisation of 
abortion as compared to just 31 per cent who are opposed to such an initiative.   
To what extent do these differences among the attenders remain when a range 
of background control variables, such as religious affiliation, gender, marital status, 
age and socio-economic background, are included in the analysis? Table 4 addresses 
this question.4 The results are clear. Irrespective of whether attitudes towards gay 
marriage or abortion are considered, while there are no notable differences between 
the culturally religious and non-attenders in relation to this issue, this is not the case 
when the most religiously committed are considered who are notably different, or less 
supportive, in their views. Even when a range of background variables, such as 
religious affiliation, gender, marital status, age and socio-economic status, are 
included in the analysis, the most religiously committed, or individuals who believe 
and belong, are significantly less likely to support the legalisation of gay marriage and 
abortion than the culturally religious, or those who belong but do not believe (the 
omitted category for comparison).   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
This is not to suggest, however, that religiosity, or the intersection between 
religious belief and practice, is the sole predictor of attitudes in this instance. Other 
significant net determinants include the consistent effects of religious affiliation, 
gender, age and educational attainment. While females and the educated were notably 
more supportive of both gay marriage and abortion rights than either males or those 
with no educational qualifications, older individuals were significantly more negative 
than their younger counterparts in term of their views. A somewhat more complex 
pattern emerges when the effect of religious affiliation is considered. As in previous 
research, while Catholics were notably more likely to support gay marriage than 
Protestants, they were significantly less likely to do so when the question of abortion 
rights is considered.  
Conclusion 
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Over the last few decades there has been a dramatic change in public attitudes towards 
gay rights in the United States, Great Britain and elsewhere in Europe.  Although 
same-sex relations remain a perennial topic of debate within these societies, the 
overall trend has been a growing acceptance of gay rights and increasing legislative 
protection for these rights.  This is not to negate, however, substantial cross-national 
variation in relation to this issue, particularly when the issue of same-sex unions, or 
gay marriage, is considered. Although same-sex relations in general seem to be more 
widely accepted than a few decades ago, the extent to which same-sex unions are 
similarly endorsed differs considerably both within and between nations. In fact, some 
commentators have suggested that disputes over gay rights, such as the legal 
recognition of same-sex unions, have now replaced abortion rights as one of the most 
contentious and divisive issues in contemporary western democracies.    
It has long been established that religious affiliation, belief and behaviour are 
associated with an individual’s attitudes towards same-sex relations and gay rights. 
This is also the case when attitudes towards same-sex marriage are considered. There 
is now a growing body of research to suggest that people who are the most opposed to 
gay marriages tend to be more religiously devout on a variety of measures such as 
attachment, belief and practice. In fact, previous research demonstrates that such 
religious factors are among the strongest predictors of variation in public opinion 
towards gay marriage and abortion rights. Yet, what we know about the effect of 
religion on both gay marriage and abortion rights remains somewhat limited.  This is 
particularly so when the intersection of religious belief and belonging is investigated. 
Although much attention has been paid to the net effects of these religious measures 
on attitudes towards gay marriage and abortion rights, to date the intersection of these 
two factors in determining public views has not been investigated. This is particularly 
the case for those who belong but do not believe, who have been dismissed in the 
literature as illogical or at best a transitory stage, as well as socially and politically 
irrelevant. 
The results of this investigation, however, call into question both these 
assumptions. Our arguments in support of this proposition are threefold. First, at eight 
per cent of the population, those who belong but do not believe, or the culturally 
religious, form a notable minority group within Northern Irish society. Second, there 
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is also some evidence to suggest that at least as far as their socio-demographic profile 
is concerned, the culturally religious may be considered a distinct group. As the 
results of this investigation also demonstrate, not only are those who belong but do 
not believe disproportionately drawn from the Catholic tradition, but they are also 
significantly more likely to be female, married, and among the better-educated 
members of society. Moreover, this relationship holds regardless of whether 
comparisons with either the most religiously committed or those who neither believe 
nor belong are considered. Finally, at least in comparison with the most religiously 
committed, those who belong but do not believe are also distinctive in terms of their 
views on new morality issues, such as gay marriage and abortion rights. Irrespective 
of whether attitudes towards the legalisation of gay marriage or abortion are 
considered, the culturally religious, or those who belong but do not believe, stand out 
as significantly more supportive of both these issues than the most religiously 
committed. Moreover, this relationship remains regardless of whether or not socio-
demographic factors are taken into account.  
These findings have a number of implications for future research in this area. 
First, while religion plays a crucial role in shaping public perceptions of moral issues, 
such as gay marriage and abortion rights, the impact of religion is both complex and 
variable and this is particularly the case when the intersection between belief and 
practice is considered. As the results of this study demonstrates clearly, while no 
notable differences emerged in comparison to the non-attenders, those who belong but 
do not believe, or the culturally religious, are notably more likely to adopt a liberal 
stance in relation to both these issues than the most religiously committed, or those 
who both belong and believe. It is to a further investigation of this issue, or the 
intersection between belief and practice, that future research should be directed. 
Second, particular attention should be paid to the religious and spiritual background as 
well as the motivations of those who belong but do not believe. For example, previous 
research based on the culturally religious in continental Europe suggests that one key 
factor in accounting for their attendance is their attachment to their national churches 
as a marker of cultural belonging and a historical heritage (Kasselstrand 2015).  
Further, future studies should also focus on the long-term impact of this divergence in 
moral views among regular attenders. For example, previous research suggests that 
 17  
  
  
persons who attend diverse congregations, such as those with a multiracial 
composition, are notably more likely to support gay marriage and adoption than those 
who attend more racially homogeneous ones (Perry 2013). To what extent will similar 
results, or an increasing congruency in moral outlooks, also emerge when the long-
term impact of differences in religious belief among the attenders are considered?  
Finally, the present research also points to the need for complementary on-the-ground 
qualitative studies to provide a more fine-grained and nuanced investigation of this 
understudied minority, those who belong but do not believe, both in terms of their 
reasons for religious participation and their relations with others, both believers and 
non-believers as well as those who attend church services and those who do not. As a 
distinct, theoretically and empirically important minority within Northern Ireland, and 
elsewhere, there is much to be learned about both their (un)belief and their 
participation as well as their views on a range of moral and socio-political issues.   
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Endnotes 
1  Unlike the rest of the UK, where same-sex marriages were granted legal status in 2014, 
this is not the case in Northern Ireland where, since 2004, legal status is restricted to 
civil-partnerships among gay couples. Similarly, unlike the rest of the UK which allows 
for abortion up to 24 weeks with the permission of two doctors under the aegis of the 
1967 Abortion Act, abortion is only permitted in Northern Ireland if a woman’s life is 
at risk or if there is a permanent or serious risk to her mental and physical health 
(Thomson, 2016). 
2  The 2015 Northern Ireland General Election Survey was collected by Jonathan Tonge, 
Jocelyn Evans, Bernadette C. Hayes, Paul Mitchell and Peter Shirlow and funded by 
the Economic and Social Research Council (Grant Number: ES/L007320/1).  The data 
is publicly available from the UK Data Service. 
3  Alternative analyses, which also included either religious independents (those who 
currently claim to have no religious affiliation) or the total sample, gave rise to 
identical substantive conclusions in terms of the effect of our primary variable of 
interest, namely the impact of religious belief and attachment on attitudes towards gay 
marriage and abortion rights. 
4  An alternative analysis which included belonging and believing as two separate 
variables in the regression equation indicated that both were significant net 
determinants of attitudes towards gay marriage and abortion. Moreover, other 
significant net determinants in the model, such as the consistent effects of religious 
affiliation, gender, age and educational attainment were identical in this instance, 
although it should be noted that the R-squared, or proportion of variance explained, was 
somewhat lower in this analysis than in the combined, or four-category, investigation. 
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Table 1: Religious belief and practice in Northern Ireland 
 (Percentages) 
Belief in God:  
Yes 68.4 
  Believe with no doubts (42.7) 
  Believe with doubts (25.7) 
No 31.6 
   Only some of the time (19.0) 
   Do not believe (12.6) 
Total 100.0 
[N] [1,448] 
  
Church Attendance:  
Regular 44.1 
  Weekly (16.3) 
  Monthly (27.8) 
Irregular 55.9 
   Less than monthly (45.7) 
   Never (10.2) 
Total 100.0 
[N] [1,448] 
 
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A Typology of religious belief and practice 
Religious  Religious Belief 
Practice Yes No 
 
Regular 
 
Believing and Belonging 
(35.7%) 
 
Belonging without 
Believing 
(8.3%) 
 
Irregular 
 
Believing without 
Belonging 
(32.9%) 
 
Neither Believing nor 
Belonging 
(23.1%) 
 
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015.  
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Table 2: Differences in background characteristics among those who belong 
and/or believe 
 (Percentages) 
 Attenders Non-attenders 
 Belong 
only 
Believe 
and 
Belong 
Believe 
Only 
Neither Believe 
nor Belong 
     
Catholic 66.4   48.2*   38.6* 33.4* 
Female 61.3 56.6   51.3* 47.0* 
Married 69.0 65.9 61.3 56.2* 
Age (18-45 
years) 
50.0   31.2* 52.3 65.7* 
Tertiary-
Educated  
23.3 23.4   14.7*            15.9* 
Non-manual 32.8 37.9 31.6            24.7 
Labour active 55.9   44.4* 57.1 70.0* 
 
Notes: * significantly different from Non-believers who attend church regularly at the 
0.05 level (two-tailed). 
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015.  
 
 
Table 3: Differences in attitudes towards gay marriage and abortion among 
those who belong and/or believe 
 
 (Percentages) 
 Attenders Non-attenders  
  
Belong 
only 
 
Believe 
and 
Belong 
 
Believe 
only 
Neither 
Believe nor 
Belong 
 
 
Total 
      
Gay Marriage:      
Strongly agree 26.9 18.6 30.2 32.1 26.2 
Agree 39.5 19.8 30.0 25.8 26.2 
Neither agree or 
disagree  
18.5 17.6 13.0 25.2 17.9 
Disagree 5.9 14.3 12.3 6.7 11.2 
Strongly disagree 9.2 29.7 14.5 10.3 18.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(N) (119) (511) (470) (330) (1,430) 
      
Abortion:      
Strongly agree 30.3 12.9 23.8 34.7 23.0 
25 
 
Agree 22.7 15.7 27.6 20.8 21.4 
Neither agree or 
disagree 
28.6 24.9 22.5 24.8 24.4 
Disagree 12.6 16.3 12.3 8.8 12.9 
Strongly disagree 5.9 30.2 13.8 10.9 18.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(N) (119) (510) (510) (331) (1,431) 
 
Questions: Gay marriage should be made legal in Northern Ireland; Abortion should 
be made legal in Northern Ireland. 
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015.  
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Table 4: The net effect of belonging without believing on attitudes towards gay 
marriage and abortion 
 
 Regression Coefficients (OLS) 
 Gay Marriage Abortion 
 B beta b beta 
Control variables     
Catholic     0.09** (0.20)       -0.03*    (-0.06) 
Female      0.05** (0.11) 0.03* (0.06) 
Married 0.01 (0.02)        0.02 (0.03) 
Age (years)   -0.01** (-0.29)  -0.01**    (-0.14) 
Education:     
  Tertiary   0.05* (0.08)        0.01 (0.02) 
  Secondary     0.08** (0.18)        0.04* (0.09) 
  No qualificationa --- --- --- --- 
Non-manual  0.01 (0.03)  0.04** (0.08) 
Labour active 0.02 (0.03)        0.02 (0.05) 
     
Religiosity effect:     
Belonging but not Believinga --- --- --- --- 
Believing and Belonging    -0.09** (-0.19)      -0.12** (-0.26) 
Believing but not Belonging      -0.03 (-0.05)      -0.03 (-0.07) 
Neither Believing nor 
Belonging  
     -0.02 (-0.04)      -0.01 (-0.03) 
     
Constant      
0.399** 
      0.364**  
R-squared        .292         .141  
(N)   (1,387)    (1,358)  
 
Note: Attitudes towards the legalisation of gay marriage and abortion are coded from 
0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree); Standardised regression coefficients 
are in parentheses; a, omitted category of comparison; *, significant at the 0.05 
level; **, significant at the 0.01 level. 
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
